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CABLE TELEVISION: A NEW
CHALLENGE FOR THE "OLD" FIRST
AMENDMENT
Cable television has ushered in a new era in the technology of
communications media.' As with other media, questions have
arisen regarding the appropriate first amendment treatment of
cable television.2 Most recently, courts have reviewed the constitu-
I See G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND, & J. MERCURIO, "CABLESPEECH": THE CASE FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION 1-4 (1983); Wheeler, Cable Television: Where It's Been, Where It's
Headed, 56 FLA. B.J. 228, 228-30 (1982). A cable television system is a nonbroadcast facility
which transmits broadcast signals to subscribers along cable paths. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a)
(1984). These broadcast signals are transmitted to a "head-end" site, processed for trans-
mission, and then carried by cable or optical fibers into homes wired for cable television
reception. See Wheeler, supra, at 229.
Cable television has been described as a communications medium with "virtually un-
limited possibilities and uses." Id. at 228. Improvements in cable technology have made
possible greatly expanded capacity, from the first 12 channel systems in the 1960's to a
current 54 channel capacity. See G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND & J. MERCURIO, supra, at 1. It is
projected that dual cable systems of the future will enable delivery of 108 cable channels. Id.
Fiber optic technology may provide new growth possibilities, including text services on both
a one-way and a two-way basis, alarm and security services, merchandise ordering, and elec-
tronic fund transfers. Id. at 3.
2 See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22-25 (1976); see also Lively, Fear and
the Media: A First Amendment Horror Show, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1074-91 (1985) (fear of
potential evil of new forms of media has given rise to regulation which circumscribes first
amendment rights of such media).
The first amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. New methods of
communication are often the battleground for renewed conflict over first amendment issues.
See Bollinger, supra, at 24. For example, motion pictures were initially given no first
amendment protection because they were viewed solely as business ventures, and not as
part of the press. See, e.g., Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 242-47
(1915). Thus, in Mutual Film, the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio statute permitting cen-
sorship of motion pictures. See id. In 1951, however, the Court overruled Mutual Film, and
held that motion pictures are protected by the first amendment. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1951). Nevertheless, the Joseph Burstyn Court limited its
holding by stating that the Constitution does not require "absolute freedom to exhibit...
motion picture[s] of every kind at all times and . . . places," nor does the Constitution
subject motion pictures to the same rules governing other modes of expression. Id. at 502-
03.
The various broadcast media have been scrutinized to determine the first amendment
protection appropriate to each. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943) (radio); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981)
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tionality of cable regulations such as franchising ordinances, 3 pub-
lic access requirements, 4 and must-carry regulations.5 The result-
ing court opinions have focused on the nature of the cable medium
and its similarities to other media, and thus present a somewhat
piecemeal approach to cable television regulation.6 A clear and
(television); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (review of
regulation of broadcast media). In National Broadcasting Co., the Court held that because
radio is not inherently available to all speakers, it may be subject to government regulation.
See National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 226. This rationale, now called the "scarcity
doctrine," became the basis for later decisions concerning the regulation of the broadcast
media. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 388-89; see also Bollinger, supra, at 7
n.21 (criticising "scarcity doctrine").
Cable television initially was given the same first amendment status as broadcast televi-
sion. See Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968). Later, however,
courts began to distinguish cable from broadcast television. See, e.g., Midwest Video Corp.
v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1053-57 (8th Cir. 1978) (FCC authority to intrude on cable operator's
first amendment rights is less than its authority over broadcasters), aff'd on other grounds,
440 U.S. 689 (1978); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-46 (D.C. Cir.) (first
amendment theory applied to broadcasting is not directly applicable to cable television
since physical scarcity element is absent), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
3 See, e.g., Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330,
1339 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (first amendment claim stated by cable operator who was refused ac-
cess to Air Force base to provide cable services); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985) (granting only one cable television
franchise when more could be physically accommodated violated first amendment), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985); see infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 988 (D.R.I. 1983)
(public access regulations held constitutional), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.
1985); see infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
' See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (FCC must-
carry regulations violate first amendment), petition for cert. filed sub nom. National Ass'n
of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1985)(No. 85-
502); see infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
I Compare Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("cable
television shares attributes of the more traditional press"), petition for cert. filed sub nom.
National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 23,
1985) (No. 85-502) and Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055 (8th Cir. 1978)
(noting similarity between cable television and newspapers), afl'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) with
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-79 (10th Cir. 1981)
(refusing to apply newspaper analysis to cable television), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001
(1982) and Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985 (D.R.I. 1983)
("[n]ewspapers and cable television cannot be equated"), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st
Cir. 1985).
The disagreement as to whether cable television most resembles print or broadcast me-
dia is not confined to the courts. Compare Comment, Cable Television: The Constitutional
Limitations of Local Government Control, 15 Sw. U.L. REv. 181, 182 (1984) (no distinction
between cable television and publishing for first amendment purposes) [hereinafter cited as
Constitutional Limitations of Local Control] with Comment, Hit or Myth?: The Cable TV
Marketplace, Diversity and Regulation, 35 FED. Com L.J. 41, 42 (1983) (cable should be
regulated in ways that print is not). See generally Comment, Berkshire Cablevision v.
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consistent first amendment analysis of cable television has not yet
been developed,7 resulting in conflicts among the federal courts of
appeals.' The Cable Communications Policy Act9 ("the Act"),
passed in 1984, raises additional questions about the first amend-
ment status of cable television, and demonstrates the need for the
Supreme Court to establish first amendment guidelines for the
cable medium.10
This Note will address the need for a comprehensive first
amendment approach to cable television by discussing three inter-
related areas. First, the Note will examine the first amendment
treatment of franchising, must-carry, and public access regulations
in three recent cases, and describe the common analytical ap-
proaches of the courts. Second, the meaning and purposes of the
first amendment and its shifting twentieth century interpretations
will briefly be examined. Third, the Note will critique recent first
amendment developments, which, it is submitted, have compro-
mised basic constitutional values and enlarged governmental regu-
lation of the press. This Note will recommend that even though a
more traditional, laissez-faire first amendment approach might in-
validate many existing cable television regulations, such an ap-
Burke: Toward a Functional First Amendment Classification of Cable Operators, 70 IOWA
L.J. 525, 543 (1985) (cable television performs functions similar to broadcast, print, and
common carriers and should be regulated according to each function) [hereinafter cited as
Functional First Amendment Classification].
" See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
a Compare Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1978) (cable
has same first amendment protections as newspapers), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689
(1979) and Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.) (no constitutional dis-
tinction between cable television and newspapers with regard to economic scarcity), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) with Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660
F.2d 1370, 1378 n.9, 1378-79 (10th Cir. 1981) (newspaper analysis not applicable to cable
television), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). See generally Berkshire Cablevision, Inc.
v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 984-86 (D.R.I. 1983) (discussion of differing approaches to con-
stitutional status of cable television), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
9 Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 and scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. II 1984)). The purpose of the Cable Communications
Policy Act [hereinafter "the Act"] is to establish a national cable communications policy.
See 47 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Providing guidelines for federal, state and
local regulation of cable television, the Act establishes franchising procedures, see id. §§
541-547, and grants localities the right to require public, educational, and governmental ac-
cess channels, see id. § 531. To "assure that the widest possible diversity of information
sources" are available, commercial access to cable channels is also mandated. Id. § 532. For
a discussion of the background and need for cable legislation, see H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4656, 4657-60.
1* Cf. infra notes 28-29, 37, 44 and accompanying text.
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proach is preferable to expanding government control of speech
into the cable medium.
THE REGULATORY HISTORY OF CABLE TELEVISION
Cable television was established in the 1940's to serve viewers
in areas with poor broadcast reception. 1 In the early years of cable
television, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) hesi-
tated to regulate cable television, questioning whether it possessed
jurisdiction over this medium.'2 However, in light of the fact that
cable television retransmits broadcast signals, the FCC eventually
determined that pursuant to its regulatory authority over broad-
cast television, it had jurisdiction to impose minimal rules on cable
operators." This jurisdiction was based on the need to ameliorate
11 See M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 1.02 (Supp. 1985). The number of homes sub-
scribing to cable television increases continually as more and more urban and suburban
areas become wired for cable. See CoMMraE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS INDUSTRY 290 (H.R. Print 97-V 1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Print 97-V]. It is
projected that by 1990, nearly 50% of U.S. households will be wired for cable. See id.
12 See CATV and TV Repeater Servs., 26 F.C.C. 403, 404 (1959). The FCC initially
stated that it had "no present basis for asserting jurisdiction ... over CATV's" other than
its minimal regulation of CATV's radiation of energy. Id. at 431. This denial of jurisdiction
was a response to the request of broadcasters for regulation of CATV's because of their
alleged "adverse impact upon broadcasting" and their tendency to "thwart" the FCC's re-
sponsibility to "foster nationwide radio and television service." Id. at 430. However, the
FCC did recommend that two of the broadcasters' suggestions be enacted by Congress. Id.
at 441. These proposals required that the CATV's obtain consent of the broadcasters to
transmit their signals, and that the CATV operators carry the signal of local stations if
requested to do so by the station. Id. The latter suggested regulation is the forerunner of the
present must-carry rules. See infra note 31. For further discussion of early regulatory ques-
tions, see M. HAMBURG, supra note 11, at § 1.03-.04.
"s See First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 713 (1965). The FCC determined that the
Communications Act of 1934 vested it with rulemaking authority over all CATV systems.
See id. at 685. This determination represented a shift from the position taken in the 1959
ruling. See supra note 12. The FCC found that changed circumstances in the interim period
made it necessary to regulate CATV to protect the financial health of broadcast stations.
First Report and Order, supra, at 713. This shift in the FCC's position was foreshadowed in
1962 when the agency refused a common carrier's request for a license to construct a system
to transmit television signals to CATV's based on the adverse economic impact such a sys-
tem would have on a local broadcast station. See Carter Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459,
465 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963); see also Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725,
733-34 (1966) (carriage and non-duplication rules extended to all CATV systems, expanding
scope of FCC jurisdiction). For further discussion of the development of FCC regulation of
cable television, see Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1439-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 54
U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1985) (No. 85-502); Smith, Primer on the Regulatory Devel-
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any possible adverse impact of cable television on broadcast televi-
sion.14 In 1968, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's jurisdiction
over cable retransmission of broadcast as "reasonably ancillary" to
its regulation of broadcast. 15 However, in 1979, the Court refused
to extend FCC jurisdiction to allow the regulation of cable televi-
sion as a common carrier."'
As federal regulatory policies shifted, local governments estab-
lished their own cable television regulations.17 In 1984, Congress
finally addressed the issue with the passage of the Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act.' 8 This legislation has clarified the division of
opment of CATV (1950-72), 18 How. L.J. 729, 729-60 (1975); Note, FCC Regulation of Cable
Television Content, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 238, 238-48 (1978).
14 First Report and Order, supra note 13, at 713. When the FCC first asserted its juris-
diction over cable television, the rules promulgated related only to the operations of CATV
that involved the reception and transmission of broadcast signals. See Smith, supra note 13,
at 741.
"' See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). In South-
western Cable, the Court held that the FCC could regulate CATV systems because it had
authority over all "interstate [and foreign] communication by wire or radio." Id. at 178
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)). The Court held, however, that the FCC's authority was re-
stricted to that required for the effective regulation of television broadcasting. 392 U.S. at
178. See generally Note, supra note 13, at 241-48 (history of FCC regulation of cable
television).
16 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979). In Midwest Video, the
challenged rules had been promulgated by the FCC and required, inter alia, that cable oper-
ators serving 3500 or more subscribers develop at least a 20 channel capacity and provide
four access channels on those systems with sufficient activated capacity to do so. See Report
and Order in Docket No. 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 297 (1976). The four access channels were
to be for "public, educational, local government and leased channel use." Id. at 294 n.1.
These rules were intended to promote diversity in programming and a sense of participation
in the video medium. Id. at 296.
The Court held that the rules were beyond the FCC's statutory authority because they
were not "reasonably ancillary" to the effective regulation of broadcast television. 440 U.S.
at 708-09. This holding was based only on statutory grounds; the Court did not rule on the
constitutionality of the regulations except to note that the constitutional question was "not
frivolous." Id. at 709 n.19.
17 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53006 (West Supp. 1984) (requiring operators to obtain
local franchises before laying cables); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 26, § 609(A) (1980) (cable com-
pany cannot cease service or transfer ownership unless permitted to do so by local govern-
ment); N.Y. Exac. LAW § 819 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985) (requiring cable operators to
obtain franchise before using city's streets to lay cable); see also Albert, The Federal and
Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 501, 508-13 (1977) (discussing role
of state and local governments in regulation of cable television). Local jurisdiction over
cable television is usually predicated upon the locality's power to regulate its streets, or to
protect the health and safety of its citizens, or upon a specific state grant of authority to
issue franchises. See Albert, supra, at 509.
-8 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1982 & Supp. II 1984); see supra note 9.
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federal, state, and local regulatory authority over cable television. 9
Although the constitutionality of this legislation has yet to be
tested,2° both FCC regulations and state and local ordinances have
been challenged on constitutional grounds.2'
Franchising Ordinances
The constitutionality of a local franchising ordinance was
tested in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles.22
In Preferred Communications, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that a city ordinance granting only one
cable franchise per region when more could be physically accom-
modated on public utility poles violated the first amendment.23 Us-
19 See supra note 9. The policy established by the Cable Communications Policy Act
"continues reliance on the local franchising process as the primary means of cable television
regulation, while defining and limiting the authority that a franchising authority may exer-
cise through the franchise process." HR. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4656, 4656. FCC regulations have wide-ranging implica-
tions; therefore, Congress saw a need to enact legislation which would provide uniform fed-
eral standards for cable franchising. See id. at 4661. It was believed that franchising author-
ity was most appropriately placed in the hands of local officials, who would have the best
understanding of local communications needs. See id.
20 See Price & Nadel, Ways to Cope with Change, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 50, col.
3. The legislative history of the Act specifically addressed the issue of first amendment con-
cerns raised by cable access requirements. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4656, 4668-73. The House Committee on
Energy and Commerce stated that the Act "secured the first amendment right of viewers
and listeners to a diversity of information sources, in a manner least restrictive on the cable
operators' first amendment interests." Id. at 4673.
21 See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (FCC
must-carry rules held unconstitutional), petition for cert. filed sub nom. biational Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1985) (No. 85-502);
Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1985)
(local franchise ordinance struck down on constitutional grounds because less restrictive
means available to further governmental interest), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985);
Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 988 (D.R.I. 1983) (local public access
regulations upheld against first amendment challenges), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st
Cir. 1985).
22 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
22 See id. at 1411. Pursuant to a statutory grant of authority, the city of Los Angeles
devised an auction process for the allocation of a single franchise per region. Id. at 1400; see
also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066 (West Supp. 1984) (authorizing local governments to develop
franchising schemes for cable television). As part of the auction process, the city imposed a
number of conditions, including the payment of a number of fees to the city, the filing of an
outline of proposed operations, and the demonstration of proper "character iualifications."
754 F.2d at 1400. In addition, the company awarded the franchise was required to provide,
without compensation, two channels each for use by the city, for educational use, for use by
the general public and for leased access, along with staff and facilities to aid in program-
ming. Id. The city was to choose, at its discretion, the operator it deemed "best" for each
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ing the standard of review for incidental restrictions on noncom-
municative aspects of speech set out by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien,24 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the franchise ordinance was not the least
restrictive means by which the city could protect its public re-
sources.25 In addition, reasoning that the utility structures in ques-
tion were a "kind of public forum,"26 the court determined that the
franchising scheme went beyond the reasonable time, place, and
manner regulation of speech permissible in a public forum. The
court suggested that the Cable Communications Policy Act, which
specifically provides that local authorities have the power to award
"one or more franchises within its jurisdiction, '28 was not intended
area. Id. at 1401.
24 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court created a test for determining the reasona-
bleness of regulations aimed at controlling the noncommunicative aspects of speech:
[a] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377; see also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 47-50 (D.C. Cir.) (applying
O'Brien test to pay-cable rules), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
2 See 754 F.2d at 1405-06. The least restrictive means approach used by the Preferred
Communications court has been described as requiring that the "government, when it has
available a variety of equally effective means to a given end,. . . choose the measure which
least interferes with individual liberties." Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amend-
ment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 464 (1969); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967)
(statute barring Communists from defense employment not least drastic means); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960) (statute requiring teachers to disclose membership in all
organizations not least drastic means). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrurioNAL
LAw 682-88 (1978) (discussion of least restrictive alternatives and content-neutral abridge-
ments of speech).
26 754 F.2d at 1409. The Ninth Circuit's classification of utility poles as a type of public
forum was based on the state's policy of dedicating "surplus space" on poles for cable televi-
sion use. Id.; see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 767.5(b) (West Supp. 1984). When a public forum is
involved, the state is not only forbidden from regulating on the basis of content, it may not
regulate speech-related conduct at all except in a limited manner when a compelling govern-
mental interest exists. See L. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 689.
27 See 754 F.2d at 1409.
28 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). In § 541, Congress established the basis
for state and local regulation of cable systems through franchising power. See id. The legis-
lative history suggests that this was done to grant local authorities the "discretion to deter-
mine the number of cable operators to be authorized to provide service in a particular geo-
graphic area." H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sass., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4656, 4696.
The Preferred Communications court discussed provisions of the Act in several foot-
notes, but did not rule on the constitutionality of any of the cited provisions. See 754 F.2d
at 1400 n.3, 1401-02 n.4, 1411 n.11. However, it did note that the mandatory and leased
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to give local authorities broad discretionary power to determine
the number of cable operators in a particular area.29
Must-Carry Rules
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,s0 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered the consti-
tutionality of the FCC "must-carry" regulations,31 which require
cable operators to transmit upon request the signals of all broad-
cast television stations within thirty-five miles of the community
served and the signals of any other stations "significantly viewed in
the community. '32 In its first amendment analysis of these regula-
tions, the court, applying the O'Brien test, determined that the
FCC had failed to demonstrate a substantial government interest
in protecting local broadcasting, 33 and that the rules were "grossly
access requirements found in 47 U.S.C. §§ 531-532 posed "particularly troubling constitu-
tional questions." 754 F.2d at 1401 n.4 (dictum).
19 See 754 F.2d at 1411 n.11 (dictum). Citing legislative history, the Preferred Commu-
nications court declared that a "construction of such breadth would be invalid." Id.
30 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed sub nom. National Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1985) (No. 85-502).
31 See id. at 1454-62. Quincy Cable TV, a cable operator in Quincy, Washington, sought
review of the FCC denial of its request for a partial waiver of the must-carry rules. Id. at
1446-47. Because of Quincy's proximity to Spokane and Seattle, Quincy Cable had been
required to carry the mostly duplicative broadcasts of the three network affiliates of both
cities on what was originally a 12 channel system. Id. at 1446. Quincy's petition for review of
the FCC decision was consolidated with a petition for review by Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem (TBS), a cable programmer engaged in the business of selling cable programs to opera-
tors. Id. at 1445. TBS had unsuccessfully requested the FCC to consider a deletion of the
must-carry rules. Id.
31 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.5, 76.51, 76.53, 76.55, 76.57, 76.59, 76.61 (1984); see also M.
HAMBURG, supra note 11, at § 2.06(1)(a) (discussing must-carry regulations). In 1972, the
FCC adopted rules which provide the basic outline of the must-carry regulations today. See
Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 220-33 (1972). The FCC's stated objec-
tives were to ensure the carriage of "local" stations on cable television, and, when appropri-
ate, to ameliorate the competitive impact of "distant" signal carriage. See id. at 173; see
also CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Appendix A, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 816-26
(1980) (history of signal carriage regulation); G. SHAPIRO, P. KuRLAND & J. MERCURIO, supra
note 1, at 137-50 (analysis of development and effects of must-carry rules).
" See 768 F.2d at 1454, 1459; see also supra note 24 (discussing O'Brien test). The
Quincy Cable TV court, in a detailed discussion of the state interest in protecting local-
oriented broadcasting, determined that the FCC had failed to establish that the economic
health of local broadcasting would suffer without protective regulations. See 768 F.2d, at
1455-57. The court noted that in a 1979 report studying the relationship between broadcast
and cable television, the FCC itself concluded that" 'competition from cable television does
not pose a significant threat to conventional television or to our overall broadcasting poli-
cies.'" Id. at 1456 (quoting Economic Inquiry Report, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 661 (1979)). As a
result of these findings, the FCC determined that "cable television distant signal and syndi-
1985]
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overinclusive."3 4
Although the District of Columbia Circuit used the less strin-
gent O'Brien standard of review, it strongly suggested that the
must-carry regulations were actually a form of content regulation,
interfering with the editorial discretion of the cable operator.3 5 As
such, the court suggested, without deciding, that a stricter stan-
dard of review was in fact more appropriate.3 6 The court did not
refer to the Cable Communications Policy Act; nevertheless, its de-
cision calls into question the constitutionality of the intent of the
Act to leave intact the FCC must-carry rules. 7
Public Access Rules
A third area of first amendment concern is the application of
public access regulations to cable television.3 8  In Berkshire
Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke,39 the United States
District Court for Rhode Island upheld local mandatory public ac-
cess regulations, finding no first amendment violation.40 Declaring
cated exclusivity rules can be deleted." Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Cable Television
Syndicated Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004, 1054 (1979).
3' See 768 F.2d at 1460. The regulations protect each broadcaster regardless of the
amount of local broadcasting available to the community or the amount of local program-
ming already carried by the cable operator. Id.
3" See id. at 1453-54. It is well established that "[a]ny government action aimed at
communicative impact is presumptively at odds with the first amendment." L. TRIBE, supra
note 25, at 581; see, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) ("govern-
ment has no power to restrict [picketing] because of its message"); Police Dept. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("First Amendment means that the government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message .... or its content"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 19 (1971) (government may not interfere with substantive message of speech).
31 See 768 F.2d at 1448.
'3 See 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. H 1984). Section 532 states in part: "An
operator of any cable system with 36 or more . . . activated channels shall designate 10
percent of such channels which are not otherwise required for use. . . by Federal law or
regulation." Id. (emphasis added). In the sectional analysis of the legislative history, the
italicized language is said to mean that "channels devoted to carriage of must carry signals
. . . must be subtracted from the total number of activated channels contained on the cable
system." H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4656, 4685.
36 See supra note 16; see also G. SHAPIRo, P. KURLAND & J. MERCURIO, supra note 1, at
78-79 (background of FCC public access regulations).
3, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
,0 Id. at 988. The public access regulations in question in Berkshire required that the
cable operator provide at least one access channel each for three categories of broadcasters:
members of the public, educational institutions, and government agencies. Id. at 978. Addi-
tionally, the operator was required to provide on-site facilities for the origination and trans-
mission of programming by each group. Id.
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the O'Brien test to be applicable, the Berkshire court held that the
regulations involved were no broader than necessary to further the
important governmental objective of community participation in
cable television production and programming.41 Underpinning this
view was the court's conclusion that cable television is not entitled
to the same treatment accorded to the print media because of its
burden on the public domain and its natural monopoly characteris-
tics. 42 The court viewed the public access requirements in question
as content-neutral even though their "incidental effect" was to in-
trude on the cable operators' editorial control over their chan-
nels.43 Berkshire notwithstanding, these access provisions still pre-
sent first amendment questions."
Common Areas of Analysis
An examination of recent cable cases dealing with the first
amendment reveals several common analytical threads. As a start-
ing point, courts have held that some first amendment protection
is available to operators of cable television.45 The discussion thus
41 See id. at 988.
42 See id. at 985-86.
41 Id. at 987. But see FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707-08 n.17 (1979)
(public access regulations significantly compromise editorial discretion). When government
regulations are content-neutral, courts will often apply a balancing approach, comparing the
degree to which communication is actually inhibited with the public interests served by such
restrictions. See L. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 683. Two variables have been found important
in this weighing process: the degree to which the regulation of communication falls unevenly
on different groups, and the degree to which the regulation shuts down speech in a tradi-
tional public forum. Id. at 683-84.
44 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979). The Midwest Video
Court, while not deciding the constitutionality of public access provisions, acknowledged
that such questions were not "frivolous." Id.; see also Preferred Communications, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1401 n.4. (9th Cir.) (mandatory and leased access re-
quirements are constitutionally problematic), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985); supra
note 28-(discussing Preferred Communications).
Despite the-questionable constitutionality of public access regulations, the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 specifically grants franchising authorities the power to re-
quire public access channels for "public, educational or governmental use." 47 U.S.C. §
531(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). Comparing public access channels to the "speaker's soap
box" or the "printed leaflet," the legislative history declared that access channels "contrib-
ute to an informed citizenry by bringing local schools into the home, and by showing the
public local government at work." HR. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4656, 4667. The Act continues the policy of allowing the local
franchiser to require public access channels. Id.
4' See Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1444; Tele-Communications, Inc. v. United States,
757 F.2d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1403; Omega
Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-29 (7th Cir. 1982); Berk-
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far has centered around three basic issues relating to the nature of
the cable medium. First, courts and commentators have struggled
to determine which of the already established media cable most
resembles, analogizing cable television to both the print and broad-
cast media for purposes of first amendment analysis. 46 This has be-
come a threshold question, the answer to which often determines
the outcome of the discussion.47 While analysis by analogy can be a
helpful approach, it must not be done mechanically without regard
for the first amendment theory underlying the different regulatory
approaches.48
A second point of analysis involves the alleged natural monop-
oly characteristics of cable television. 49 Although a natural monop-
shire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 980.
46 Compare Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1450 (broadcast approach inapplicable to
cable television, which shares more qualities of print media) and Preferred Communica-
tions, 754 F.2d at 1403 (declining to apply broadcast standards to cable television) and
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (in terms of economic scarcity,
there is nothing to suggest constitutional distinction between cable television and newspa-
pers) with Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-79 (10th
Cir. 1981) (refusing to apply newspaper analysis to cable television because of cable's dis-
ruption of public domain and "medium scarcity" due to natural monopoly), cert. dismissed,
456 U.S. 1001 (1982) and Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 985-86 (because cable tele-
vision and newspapers cannot be equated, economic scarcity is constitutionally sufficient
basis of regulation). See generally CoMMTrrE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA: THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PAR-
rTy (S. Print 98-50) 34-38 (1983) (urging parity in treatment of electronic and print media
for first amendment purposes) [hereinafter cited as S. Print 98-50]; Wheeler, supra note 1,
at 230-31 (cable operators should be treated like newspapers for first amendment purposes);
Constitutional Limitations of Local Control, supra note 6, at 182 (no significant distinc-
tions between print media and cable television for first amendment purposes).
It has been suggested that cable operators perform a function more like common carri-
ers. See Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. REV. 85, 91-93 (1981); see
also Functional First Amendment Classification, supra note 6, at 543 (proposing functional
analysis utilizing print, broadcast and common carrier models).
"' See Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1453 ("if Miami Herald supplies the appropriate
mode of First Amendment analysis, our inquiry would be at an end"); see also Price &
Nadel, supra note 20, at 50, col.3. (if first amendment standard in Miami Herald is applied
to cable television, a number of provisions of Cable Policy Act would be of questionable
constitutionality).
48 Cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("[e]ach me-
dium of expression ... must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited
to it"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (broadcast television
must be assessed by standards suited to it); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (must be sensitive to "differing natures, values, abuses and dangers" of
each new form of expression).
" See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 251-52 (1977). A "natural monopoly"
exists when fixed costs (those that do not vary with output) are very large in relation to
demand. Id. at 251. As a consequence, one firm can supply the entire output required more
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oly has been described as a kind of economic scarcity,50 the Su-
preme Court has expressly rejected the notion that the print media
can be regulated because of economic scarcity.5 1 However, a scar-
city rationale has been applied to the broadcast media, and radio
and television are regulated specifically because of the "physical
scarcity" of the airwaves.52 The economic scarcity issue ultimately
efficiently that two firms "each of which incurs the same fixed costs but spreads them over
only one half the output." Id. at 252.
Posner contends that if there were no limitations on entry into the cable market, com-
panies would compete for franchises, with the company offering the best service package
and price signing up the most subscribers. Id. at 283. This competition would benefit con-
sumers since franchises would be granted on the basis of the best contract for the sub-
scriber. Id. at 284. However, he notes that franchising authorities are often more interested
in extracting concessions from the cable operator than determining who will provide the
best consumer services. See id.
It has been contended by at least one commentator that while cable television has some
of the characteristics of a natural monopoly, competition in a given area may yet be possi-
ble. See Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable Television Operator: An Unpro-
tective Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 CoMM/ENT 1, 6-10 (1981). Meyerson
argues that cable is more of a "natural oligopoly" than a natural monopoly. See id. at 10.
This conclusion is based in part on Phoenix's cable franchising system which authorized
three companies to compete for consumers. Id. at 9-10.
Other commentators dispute the notion of cable television as a natural monopoly. See,
e.g., G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND & J. MERCURIO, supra note 1, at 10-13 (so-called "natural mo-
nopoly" is caused by FCC restrictions of newly developing technology, limitation on number
of franchises by municipalities and imposition of obligations on franchise by municipality);
Lee, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REv. 867, 872 (1983) (as-
sumption that cable television is natural monopoly is self-fulfilling prophecy because munic-
ipalities rarely award more than one franchise, thus creating monopoly); see also Harmon,
Cable Television: A Changing Medium Raises New Legal Issues, 13 GOLDEN GATE L. REV.
123, 133-34 (1983) (natural monopoly argument erroneously treats cable like public utility).
50 See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404; Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378-79 (10th Cir. 1981).
8' See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974). In Miami
Herald, the Court struck down a Florida "right of reply" statute which provided that a
candidate for election or nomination whose character or official record was attacked had the
right to demand free space for a reply in the newspaper issuing the attack. See id. at 244.
The Court rejected arguments by proponents of access to the newspaper that control of
the print media had become concentrated in the hands of a few interests. Id. at 248-54.
Access proponents claimed that this concentration of control was exacerbated by economic
factors that made entry into the newspaper market prohibitively expensive, id. at 251, and
that the government had an obligation to ensure that a variety of views were made available
to the public, id. at 248.
52 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (radio may
be regulated without violating first amendment because it is not inherently available to all).
The scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation was reiterated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), in which the Court upheld the regulation of broadcast televi-
sion as a resource "whose scarcity impelled its regulation," id. at 399. The Red Lion Court
held that the fairness doctrine, id. at 373-74, which creates a right to reply similar to the
statutory right involved in Miami Herald, see id. at 373-74; see also Miami Herald, 418 U.S.
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leads back to the threshold question of whether cable television
more resembles print or broadcast media, with the implication that
analogizing cable television to the print media would preclude reg-
ulation of the speech of the cable operator even if the cable me-
dium were found to be a natural monopoly.5 3 The interference with
public rights caused by stringing cable on utility poles and burying
cable underground has been used as another argument against
analogizing cable to the print media. 4
The third component surfacing in recent cases dealing with
the first amendment rights of cable operators is the use of the
O'Brien test to determine the constitutionality of challenged regu-
lations.55 The appropriateness of using this test, which assumes
that the particular regulation in question only incidentally restricts
noncommunicative aspects of speech, has been questioned.5"
Up to this point, the first amendment analysis of cable televi-
sion has focused on analogizing cable to print or broadcast media.57
Although courts have routinely examined the factors discussed
above, those factors have lead them to reach divergent conclusions
at 244, is an enhancement of the first amendment, see 395 U.S. at 375.
Nevertheless, the first amendment imposes limits on regulation of broadcast media.
See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 138-39
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Columbia Broadcasting System, the Court declined to
find any general right of access and noted that "Congress intended to permit private broad-
casting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obliga-
tions." Id. at 110. Later, the Court held that a limited statutory right of access to broadcast
media was an appropriate balancing of the first amendment interests of the public and
broadcasters. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1980).
" See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404-05.
" See Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 985. The court refused to equate cable
television with newspapers, in part because of cable's use of public streets and utility poles.
Id. For the same reason, the court viewed government franchising of cable as "virtually
indispensable." Id.; see also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d
1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981) (cable television different from newspapers because it has signifi-
cant impact on public domain).
5 See Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1451-54; Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at
1405-06; Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 987; see also supra notes 24-25, 33, 41 and
accompanying text.
as See Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1451-54. The Quincy Cable TV court stated that
"[a]lthough the goal of the [must-carry] rules . . . can be viewed as unrelated to the sup-
pression or protection of ... ideas, [the rules] nonetheless profoundly affect values that lie
near the heart of the First Amendment." Id. at 1453. These rules limit the cable operator's
editorial discretion, prevent him from reaching his intended audience, and favor broadcast-
ers as speakers over cable operators. See id. at 1453-56. However, because the must-carry
rules failed the less exacting O'Brien test, the court declined to apply a stricter content-
based analysis. See id. at 1454.
'7 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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as to the first amendment status of cable television .5  It is submit-
ted that a cogent approach to the first amendment status of cable
television is necessary, and can be developed only by analyzing
fundamental first amendment concepts.
FIRST AMENDMENT HISTORY AND PURPOSES
In attempting to determine the meaning of the first amend-
ment, courts and commentators often resort to divining the inten-
tions of the Framers.59 This approach is complicated by the fact
that freedom of speech and freedom of the press were not initially
provided for in the Constitution."° It has been suggested that the
Framers did not have a clear notion of what they meant by free-
58 Compare Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1453 (must-carry rules interfere with cable
operators' editorial discretion) with Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 987 (incidental
effect of public access regulations is to limit cable operators' editorial control). The differing
views of these two courts on the editorial discretion issue can be viewed as related to the
print-broadcast analogy. Compare Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 985 (rejecting the
newspaper-cable comparison) with Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1453 (comparing the two
media more favorably).
59 See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (Framers intended to keep soci-
ety free by providing for freedom of press to criticize public officials); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964) (controversy surrounding Sedition Act of 1798 crystal-
lized Framers' intent that free speech was freedom to criticize government and its officials).
Commentators also refer to the Framers when attempting to support a particular reading of
the first amendment. See, e.g., Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976
WASH U.L.Q. 1, 1 (quoting Madison on need for informed public, to support "right to know"
under first amendment); Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the
Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1, 12-14 (1973) (little histor-
ical evidence to suggest that Framers sought "balanced" press such as that advocated by
proponents of access to media).
The focus on the intent of the Framers has been attacked recently. See Taylor, Bren-
nan Opposes Legal View Urged by Administration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
Justice William Brennan criticized attempts to divine the intentions of the Framers as "lit-
tle more than arrogance cloaked as humility," contending that "[ult is arrogant to pretend
that from our vantage we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of
principle to specific, contemporary questions .... Those who would restrict claims of right
to the values of 1789 ... turn a blind eye to social progress." Id. at 36, col. 3.
60 See Z. CHAF-E, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 4-6 (1941). The Bill of Rights,
guaranteeing, inter alia, freedom of speech and of the press, was proposed for adoption by
the states at the first session of Congress and eventually became part of the Constitution on
December 15, 1791. See id. at 5. The Bill of Rights adopted was the result of a compromise
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists when several states demanded these amendments
as a condition for their entry into the union. See id. at 5-6. See generally R. A. RUTLAND,
THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 159-89 (1983) (discussing compromise battle). Discerning
the Framers' intent is further complicated because there was little debate on the passage of
the Bill of Rights. J. NowAs, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 861 (2d ed.
1983).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:114
dom of speech and of the presss 1 although they regarded that free-
dom as an absolute necessity.6 2 Thus, looking to the Framers for
the meaning of the first amendment today is practically and philo-
sophically problematic,6" especially because most first amendment
jurisprudence is of twentieth century origin."
Underlying twentieth century conceptions of the first amend-
ment are several differing views of the purposes of freedom of
speech. The theory of John Stuart Mill, which envisions the pur-
pose of freedom of speech to be the discovery of truth,6 5 underlies
the doctrine of the marketplace of ideas."6 This marketplace con-
cept, permeates twentieth century first amendment theory,6  and
61 See Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. REV. 891, 898 (1949) (reviewing A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)). It appears that
even in colonial times, the meaning of free speech guarantees was not clearly understood.
See R. A. RUTLAND, supra note 60, at 91 (quoting Benjamin Franklin: "few of us, I believe,
have distinct Ideas of [the] Nature and Extent [of freedom of the press] .... If it means
the Liberty of... defaming one another, I, for my part, own myself willing to part with my
Share of it . . ").
62 See ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 142 (J. Lewis ed.
1967); P. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 13 (1972); Z. CHAFEE, supra note
60, at 16.
63 Cf. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 60, at 14 (conditions in 1791 "do not arbitrarily fix the
division between lawful and unlawful speech for all time"); Taylor, supra note 59, at 36, col
3 (impossible to gauge accurately the intentions of Framers).
64 See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT vii-viii (1966)
[hereinafter cited as GENERAL THEORY]; see also Z. CHAFEE, supra note 60, at 15 (prior to
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Court opinions contained little discussion of
freedom of speech).
85 See J. S. MILL, ON LmERTY 15-16 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978). Mill's argument for free-
dom of expression ran along three lines: (1) an opinion which is silenced may in fact be true;
(2) even if the silenced opinion is erroneous, it may contain a portion of the truth; (3) even
opinions containing the whole truth suffer if not contested, with the danger that doctrine
becomes diluted or misunderstood. See id. at 50.
" See Mininberg, Circumstances Within Our Control: Promoting Freedom of Expres-
sion Through Cable Television, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 551, 562 (1984); see also L. TRmE,
supra note 25, at 576-77 (most familiar theory of free speech is image of truth and falsehood
grappling in free marketplace); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,
25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 964 (1978) ("classic marketplace of ideas model argues that truth
can be discovered through robust debate, free from governmental interference").
The classic articulation of the marketplace doctrine is found in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), in which Justice Holmes, dissenting, declared that "the theory
of our Constitution" is that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
67 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116 (1984) (government
has interest in preserving marketplace of ideas through regulation of broadcast media); Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (government must preserve mar-
ketplace of ideas); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (debate should
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has been used both to support and to strike down government reg-
ulation of the press."8
Alexander Meiklejohn takes a different approach to first
amendment theory, categorizing the search for truth as only a sec-
ondary and individualistic concern. 9 Meiklejohn contends that the
primary purpose of the first amendment is to educate citizens so
that they may "understand the issues which bear upon our com-
mon life."170 Viewing the purpose of free speech to be the mainte-
nance of democracy, Meiklejohn contends that freedom of speech
exists not to guarantee "unregulated talkativeness," but to ensure
that "everything worth saying shall be said. '7 1 Significantly,
Meiklejohn contends that Congress is not constitutionally prohib-
ited from acting upon the freedom of speech, but rather may take
affirmative steps to promote free speech. 2
An approach that concentrates on free speech as an end rather
than a means is that developed by Thomas Emerson. 3 For Emer-
son, the right to freedom of expression is a good in itself 4 because
such freedom is an essential element of self-fulfillment.7 5 While
be "uninhibited, robust, and wide open"); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945) (first amendment rests on assumption that "widest possible dissemination" of diverse
information is essential).
88 Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (government
regulation of broadcast is consistent with first amendment because it preserves "an uninhib-
ited marketplace of ideas") with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257
(1974) (government interference with contents of newspaper is unconstitutional because it
tends to limit variety of debate).
"' See A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLrricAL FREEDOM 74 (1960).
70 Id. at 75.
71 See id. at 26. For Meiklejohn, the first amendment does not guarantee the freedom
of all kinds of speech, only political speech-i.e. that which "bears, directly or indirectly,
upon issues with which voters have to deal." Id. at 79. For a critique of this aspect of
Meiklejohn's theory, see Baldasty & Simpson, The Deceptive "Right to Know": How Pessi-
mism Rewrote the First Amendment, 56 WAsH. L. REv. 365, 370-74 (1981).
72 See A.M MKIEJOHN, supra note 69, at 19-20. Meiklejohn has proposed that the first
amendment be rewritten to express this affirmative view, suggesting that the first amend-
ment read: "'Congress, acting in cooperation with the several states and with nongovern-
mental organizations serving the same general purpose, shall have power to provide for the
intellectual and cultural education of all citizens. . . ."' Note, supra note 13, at 249 n.78
(quoting Ferry, Masscom as Educator, 35 A. SCHOLAR 293, 301 (1966)).
7' See T. EMERSON, GzNERA THEORY, supra note 64, at 4-7; see also F. SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHLOSOPHIcAL ENQUIRY 47-50 (1982) (speech is autonomous value, not merely
instrumental to social objectives).
74 See T. EMRSON, THE SYSTEM OF THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSiON 8 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as FREEDOM OF ExPREssioN].
71 Id. at 6; see also Baker, supra note 66, at 990-92 (people must be respected as ends
and not just means).
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recognizing the societal values derived from the freedom of expres-
sion 76 Emerson views these values as secondary, contending that
because the state exists to serve the individual," any limitation of
expression is an affront to the person's dignity.78 While the state
may not control expression as a means to accomplish other societal
goals, Emerson argues, it may seek to encourage freedom of expres-
sion because society tends to work against self-expression.
THE ROLE OF FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY IN THE REGULATION OF
THE MEDIA
It is submitted that because the first amendment theory of the
last seventy years has developed alongside the technological
revolution in the communications media, theory and technology
have impacted on each other in such a way as to shift our basic
understanding of the first amendment.
History of Broadcast Regulation
The development and growth of radio in the 1920's"° led to the
reexamination of the proper application of the first amendment to
the press.8 1 Traditionally, the press, in the form of print media,
was assumed to be protected from government regulation and in-
tervention.82 However, with the enactment of the Communications
"8 See T. EMERSON, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 64, at 3. Free speech serves valuable
social goals such as the "attainment of truth," id. at 7-8, the enhancement of participation
in democracy, id. at 8-11, and stabilization of the community, id. at 11-14.
77 See id. at 5.
78 See T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION, supra note 74, at 6.
7 See T. EMERSON, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 64, at 115.
8o See F. ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS 27 (1984). Three radio stations provided regular
programming in 1920; this number grew to nearly 600 in 1925. Id. Until 1927, however, the
only relevant congressional action taken was the Radio Act of 1912, the primary purpose of
which was the regulation of ship-to-shore and other maritime communications. See E. KRAS-
NOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 8-9 (1978). The Radio Act of
1927, which set up a temporary Federal Radio Commission to handle applications for sta-
tion licenses, failed to achieve its quasi-regulatory objectives. Id. at 11-12.
Recognizing the disarray of radio regulation, President Roosevelt ordered a study of
this problem in 1933, and the recommendations that resulted provided the impetus for the
Communications Act of 1934. Id. at 13.
81 See Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in New Technology: The Broadcast-Cable
Controversy, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 427, 439-40 (1975). Since broadcast media require central-
ized supervision unnecessary in the print media, a new element was introduced into first
amendment theory. See id. at 40.
82 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 168 n.16 (1979) (prior to publication no
government agency at any level can affect newspaper's decision to publish); Miami Herald
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Act of 1934,83 Congress created the FCC to regulate broadcast me-
dia, perhaps in part because broadcasting was not really viewed as
part of the "press."84 The FCC was empowered to grant a license
to broadcast if it determined "that public interest, convenience,
and necessity would be served .. ."8" This regulatory power was
predicated upon two qualities unique to the broadcast medium:
the need to allocate airwaves to prevent signal interference, and
the scarcity of airwaves upon which to broadcast."8
In 1943, the Supreme Court agreed that the physical scarcity
of airwaves justified the licensing of broadcasters.s7 But govern-
ment control did not end with licensing, for once the government
had designated who could speak over the airwaves, it also assumed
some control over what could be said.8 Those granted licenses be-
come public fiduciaries with an obligation to broadcast views rep-
resentative of the community.8 9 Thus, although the FCC is specifi-
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (traditional first
amendment jurisprudence has erected a "virtually insurmountable barrier" between govern-
ment and print media preventing government control prior to publishing); Patterson v. Col-
orado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (main purpose of first amendment
is "to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other
governments").
83 Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982)). The purpose of the
Communications Act of 1934 is to make available "a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges ... " 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The Act provided the FCC with a broad mandate of
power, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943), including the
power to determine who could speak. Id. at 215-16.
" See B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 88 (1975). Regulations were
imposed on broadcast when the nature of the medium was still unknown, because it was
perceived to be different than the print media. See Bollinger, supra note 2, at 19-20. It
seems apparent, however, that "conditions have changed sufficiently since the 1920's to war-
rant re-examination of the relationship of broadcasting to those who regulate it." R. LABUN-
SKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SIEGE 8 (1981).
85 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982).
"' See Hagelin, supra note 81, at 440-42.
87 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 266 (1943). In National
Broadcasting, the Court noted that "[u]nlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is
not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why ... it is subject to
governmental regulation." Id. at 226. But see Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommu-
nications Press, 1975 DuKE L.J. 213, 223 (development of UHF and cable television may
have eliminated scarcity problem); Lively, supra note 2, at 1083-85 (although scarcity ra-
tionale has been used to justify regulation, same scarcity exists in print media due to eco-
nomic factors which inhibit competition).
88 See W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 79 (1984); see also
infra notes 90-91.
89 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). Because broadcast-
ers are licensees rather than owners of the airwaves, they are subject to limitations in ex-
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cally denied the right of censorship, 90 it has power to regulate the
discussion of public issues through use of the equal time and fair-
ness doctrines. These doctrines purport to preserve an open forum
by requiring access to the airwaves for particular speakers in cer-
tain situations.91
change for their licensing privilege, see Functional First Amendment Classification of Cable
Operators, supra note 6, at 528, and they must operate within the conditions set forth in
their licenses, see 47 U.S.C. § 309(h) (1982). The FCC has the power to ensure that the
licensee fulfills the fiduciary duty to present views representative of the community. See E.
KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 80, at 21-22; see also 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982) (fairness
doctrine provisions).
9' See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982). Section 326 has been construed to deprive the FCC of
power to subject material to prior restraint, but generally has been held to allow the FCC to
"take note of past program content when considering a licensee's renewal application .... "
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 736 (1978); see also Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (refusing to renew license because of
repeated libels is not prohibited censorship), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). See gener-
ally S. Print 98-50, supra note 46, at 35-38 (discussing FCC content-related standards for
granting and renewing licenses).
"' See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982). The equal time requirement mandates that any broadcast
licensee who permits a candidate for public office to appear on his station must "afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcast-
ing station." Id. at § 315(a). This provision also applies to a CATV system. See id. at §
315(c)(1). "Equal time" is required for all candidates for office, and during the time immedi-
ately prior to elections, the broadcaster must sell candidates time at the station's lowest unit
charge. See E. KEASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 80, at 90-91.
The fairness doctrine is also contained in § 315(a). The doctrine requires, inter alia,
that broadcasters "afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on
issues of public importance." 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1984). The fairness doctrine provides for
a balanced presentation of information; broadcasters are therefore not required to accept
paid political advertisements. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 123-27 (1973).
Many commentators have suggested that the equal time requirement and fairness doc-
trine are at best chilling inhibitors of speech, and at worst, unconstitutional. See, e.g., H.
ASHMORE, FEAR IN THE Am 22 (1973) (fairness doctrine allows government to reduce or elim-
inate criticism of government); R. LISTON, THE RIGHT To KNOW: CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA 134-
36 (1973) (fairness regulation insults journalists by imposing principle that ranks high in
journalists' professional code, fairness in presentation of views); Lively, supra note 2, at
1083 (fairness doctrine hinders diversity by discouraging broadcasters from presenting con-
troversial programming).
The Supreme Court has recently hinted that it would reconsider the constitutionality of
the fairness doctrine if the FCC could prove that it inhibits rather than enhances free
speech. See Functional First Amendment Classification, supra note 6, at 529 n.28 (citing
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3117 n.12 (1984)); see also Lively, supra
note 2, at 1083 & n.70 (FCC proposed repeal of fairness doctrine in 1983). Nevertheless, the
FCC announced in August, 1985, that although it believed that the fairness doctrine no
longer served the public interest, it would continue to enforce the rule. See Stuart, Broad-
cast Groups Plan Fairness Rule Challenge, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1985, at C18, col. 1. A
group of broadcast organizations has asked the District of Columbia Circuit to find the fair-
ness doctrine unconstitutional because of its "chilling" effect on speech and the diversity of
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The constitutionality of the fairness doctrine was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.2 The
Red Lion opinion, however, went far beyond justifying FCC regula-
tion solely in terms of the scarcity rationale, stating that "[iut is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broad-
casters, which is paramount."9 3 Justice White, declaring that the
purpose of the first amendment is "to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas,"9 4 introduced the notion that those who mo-
nopolize the communications market may be forced to share air
time with others.9 5 Paradoxically, the first amendment, which for-
bids government abridgement of freedom of speech or of the press,
is thus construed to mandate government regulation of broadcast
speech."
Shifting First Amendment Views
Increased government control over the broadcast media has
developed alongside a shifting view of the first amendment.9 7 One
such shift in first amendment jurisprudence is the view that the
"marketplace of ideas" has failed." In this view, the laissez-faire
voices. Id.
92 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
,3 Id. at 390 (citations omitted); cf. 2 Z CHAF, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICA-
TIONS 546 (1947) (freedom of press belongs not so much to newspapers as to readers).
The right of the viewer or listener is not a general right of access to the broadcast
media. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981). It is merely a
limited right, given only when the public interest outweighs the private journalistic interests
of the broadcaster. Id. at 400 (White, J., dissenting). However, not even a limited right of
access exists in the print media. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
254-58 (1974).
" 395 U.S. at 390.
" See id. at 389; Bollinger, supra note 2, at 9-10. Requiring those who monopolize the
media to share airtime with others makes sense if the goal of the first amendment is seen as
the dissemination of diverse opinions to achieve an informed electorate. Bollinger, supra
note 2, at 10; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392 (articulating informed electorate goal); A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 69, at 75 (relevant information necessary for responsible govern-
ment decision making must be made available to electorate). The fear of communications
monopolization is rejected by many commentators. See, e.g., F. SCHAuR, supra note 73, at
39 (if government is truly servant of people, censorship by government is inappropriate be-
cause it amounts to "servants preselecting the information available to the sovereign"); S.
SIMMONS, THE FAmNEss DOCTRiNE AND THE MEDA 215 (1978) (scarcity rationale questiona-
ble); Lively, supra note 2, at 1085 (Red Lion Court's fear of monopoly rationale is on "colli-
sion course with itself" due to technological advancements).
" See 395 U.S. at 394; cf. Baldasty & Simpson, supra note 71, at 384 (giving paramount
importance to right of listener, Red Lion Court reduced speaker's freedom of speech).
97 See Baldasty & Simpson, supra note 71, at 365-87.
" See Baker, supra note 66, at 981-85. Belief in the marketplace of ideas, wherein truth
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approach to speech has permitted the monopolization of the chan-
nels of communication by a few, with the result that the flow of
information to the public has become impeded. 9 As a corollary,
advocates of this view believe that the electronic media exert a
pervasive and perhaps even dangerous influence on the public. 100
Therefore, proponents of the failed marketplace theory advocate
governmental intervention to open communication channels to the
public.101
may be discovered by an exchange of divergent views, has declined in part because modem
society tends to reject the notion that absolute truth exists. Id. at 974. Another view dis-
counts the doctrine as based on a faulty premise of rationality, and contends that the free
interchange of ideas is impossible because people are not rational, but are manipulated by
government and the media. See T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE 24 (1985) (citing Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse).
Claiming that the marketplace has failed and is controlled by private monopolies, an-
other commentator noted that a free marketplace does not exist when free expression "can
be exercised only at the sufferance of the managers of mass communications." Barron, Ac-
cess to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641, 1648 (1967).
The Court in Red Lion also assumed that an unregulated free marketplace of ideas will not
work, and that it is the government's role to create such a marketplace. See 395 U.S. at 390.
99 See J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS
MEDIA xiv, 126 (1975). Because of certain economic factors causing the monopolization of
the media, it is argued, broadcast regulations would be needed even if there were no physi-
cal scarcity. See id. at 146-47; cf. Barron, supra note 98, at 1646-47 (mass media should be
regulated because of its tendency to avoid controversy).
100 See Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 426 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., dubitante) ("broadcasting is capable of increasing perhaps the most serious of all dangers
which threaten democracy and free institutions today-the danger of passivity-of accept-
ance by masses of orders given to them and of things said to them"); see also Lively, supra
note 2, at 1072-73 (fear of "potential for evil" of news media has been rationale for limiting
first amendment rights). See generally Lange, supra note 59, at 16-21.
Because the media impact has been deemed negative, it has been assumed that the
government should step in-a conclusion at odds with the first amendment. See Note, Cable
Television and the First Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1008, 1020 (1971). Professor Jaffe
contends that the "hysterical overestimation of media power and underestimation of the
good sense of the American public" should not be used as the basis for the development of
constitutional doctrine. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections
on Fairness and Access, 85 HARv. L. REV. 768, 787 (1972).
'0' See 1 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 26-27 (1947). Expressing
concern that the laissez-faire system of speech was not working, Chafee warned that if the
press did not manage the discussion of public affairs, the government would. See id. at 27.
It has been argued that government management of access is necessary to "promote the
societal interests underlying the first amendment," which may outweigh the broadcaster's
right to freedom of expression. See Barron, supra note 98, at 1655. Proponents of a right of
access to the electronic media argue that governmental action prevents one from starting his
own broadcasting facility, while economic constraints notwithstanding, anyone can publish a
newspaper. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 73, at 126-27. For a description of the different
forms of access suggested by proponents, see Baker, supra note 66, at 981-85.
Opponents to a right of access argue that "liberty and the conditions for its exercise are
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A second shift in first amendment theory has been an in-
creased emphasis on the rights of listeners and viewers.0 2 The
right of the public to receive information necessary to make in-
formed choices is emphasized by Meiklejohn, who suggests that
"the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but
the minds of the hearers. 1 0 3 In Meiklejohn's view, therefore, the
government may organize the "town meeting" so that opposing
points of view are heard.10 This concept supports continued regu-
lation of broadcasting, but has been unable to force compromises
in the traditional laissez-faire treatment of the print media.10 5
It is suggested that both of these shifts in first amendment
philosophy are problematic. Those operating from the failed mar-
ketplace perspective tend to exhibit little confidence in the ability
of the public to reflect critically on information presented by the
media,106 and assume that all views have a right to be expressed in
the mass media.107 It may well be that the pure marketplace of
two different problems." F. ScHAUER, supra note 73, at 126; see also Lange, supra note 59,
at 90-91 (there is little support for notion that everyone should be free to express their views
in mass media).
102 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
103 A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 69, at 26. The essence of Meiklejohn's theory was en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court in Red Lion, see 395 U.S. at 390; see also supra notes 92-96
and accompanying text, and is still judicially-viable first amendment theory, cf. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 52-53 (1976)) (first amendment requires that candidates can make their views known so
"electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions
on vital public issues"). But see G. SHAPIRO, P. KuRLAND & J. MERCURIO, supra note 1, at 90-
93 (right to receive information is not absolute).
104 See A. MEIKLEnOHN, supra note 69, at 24-26. Meiklejohn's "town meeting" approach
has been criticized by Emerson, who noted that by placing the government in the role of the
moderator of the meeting, Meiklejohn "injects the government into decisions on the con-
tent, political relevance, and worth of the speech, an area that is no business of government
in a free system." Emerson, supra note 59, at 5. By focusing on the public's right to know,
and making the government the guardian of that right, the danger exists that the govern-
ment will also decide "what the public does not have a right to know." Goodale, Legal
Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 WAsH. U.L.Q. 29, 34 (emphasis in original).
105 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58 (1974); Passaic
Daily News v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1543, 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 424 U.S. 910 (1976); see also R. LABUNsKI, supra note 84, at 10
(access requirements not imposed on print media although 97.5% of daily newspapers in
United States have no in-town competition). But cf. J. BARRON, supra note 99, at 54-58
(legislation proposed which would require newspapers to publish editorial advertisements
and replies to editorials).
101 See Badasty & Simpson, supra note 71, at 385; supra note 100.
107 See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1054 (8th Cir. 1978) (rights of
cable operators arise from first amendment, but public's "'right' to get on 'television'"
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ideas exists today more in theory than reality,108 but this does not
mean that there is no diversity of views expressed across the spec-
trum of the different media. 09 Although the first amendment pro-
tects free expression so that such a marketplace may emerge, it
clearly does not mandate governmental intervention to provide
that it will. 110
The first amendment approach emphasizing the public's right
to know, which is related to the failed marketplace notion, also as-
signs to government a role in enlarging speech rights."' This ap-
proach requires the government to set the tone of a "balanced"
debate." 2 The government thereby becomes the guardian of a right
to know derived from the first amendment-yet the first amend-
ment was intended to protect the people from the government."'
It is submitted that making the government the guardian of free
speech is like leaving the fox to guard the henhouse.
stems only from FCC's desire to create that right), afl'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Lange, supra
note 59, at 90-91 (there is no right to express all ideas in mass media).
10I See supra note 98; see also L. TRmE, supra note 25, at 576-77 (when wealthy people
have more access to communications, it is questionable whether "marketplace" is appropri-
ate metaphor).
109 Cf. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting) (government regulation of broadcast may in fact contribute to lack
of diversity it is supposed to prevent), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973).
110 See Lange, supra note 59, at 11; see also F. SCHAUER, supra note 73, at 126 ("bi-
zarre" to suppose right to free speech guarantees "a right to virtually everything that might
advance the condition of some people").
III See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 69, at 19. In Meiklejohn's view, Congress is not
barred from all action upon the freedom of speech, it may legislate "to enlarge and enrich
it." Id. Advocates of this view contend that Congress should cultivate the general intelli-
gence upon which the "success of self-government so obviously depends" by promoting the
freedom of speech. Id. at 20; see also T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION, supra note 74,
at 627-29 (government should take affirmative approach to enhance citizen's right to hear
and know).
112 See Lange, supra note 59, at 77. There is little evidence that the Framers, who were
accustomed to a very partisan press, intended the first amendment to achieve a balanced
debate. See id. at 12-13. In Madison's view, abuse of speech rights was to be tolerated as a
part of the system. See id. at 77. In contrast, access proponents claim that the media owe
"positive obligations" to viewers to provide opportunity to express diverse opinions. See J.
BARRON, supra note 99, at 148. But cf. Hagelin, supra note 81, at 523 (danger of government
promoting variety of views is that power to decide what public has right to know is also
power to determine what public should not know).
113 See Media and First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEo. L.J. 867, 992 (1972).
The assumption behind regulation of the media is that the government will act in the best
interests of the public-yet this idea was repudiated by the Founders. See id.; see also
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The very purpose of
the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the
public mind through regulating the press, [and] speech ...").
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The right to know is actually a derivative of the right to
speak.114 It has been questioned whether a right to know even ex-
ists when it interferes with the rights of the speaker. 115 The over-
emphasis on the right to know, it is submitted, has led to the dilu-
tion of the right to speak and thus has modified first amendment
analysis in an insupportable way.
Both the right to know concept and the failed marketplace
theory view free speech only as a means to an end.11 6 However, if
society exists to enhance the good of individuals, the important
right of free speech cannot be relegated to the role of a mere in-
strument of democracy.1 1 7
This shift in first amendment values, coupled with technologi-
cal advancements in communications, has led to an abandonment
of the traditional laissez-faire approach in the area of broadcast
114 See Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840, 848 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979);
Baldasty & Simpson, supra note 71, at 734. In Frissell, the Third Circuit, noting that the
right to speak and the right to hear are "two sides of the same coin," nevertheless concluded
that "[t]he two rights are not, however, completely coequal: the right to hear flows from and
depends upon the right to speak. Generally, there can be no right to hear what a speaker
does not choose to say." Frissell, 597 F.2d at 848 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see also Board of Educ., Island Trees v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 867 (1982) ("right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from . . . sender's First
Amendment right to send them") (emphasis in original).
Making the right to know the "sole touchstone" of first amendment interpretation is an
unacceptable approach because it disregards the role of the first amendment in "protecting
the right of the speaker to personal self-fulfillment." Emerson, supra note 59, at 4. Although
the right to speak is "substantially absolute," the right to know is only qualified; therefore,
the danger in overemphasizing the right to know is that courts may begin to apply qualifica-
tions appropriate for the right to know to the right to speak and thus dilute first amend-
ment guarantees. Goodale, supra note 104, at 31; see also G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND & J.
MERCURIO, supra note 1, at 90-93 (discussing right to "receive" information).
l5 See B. OWEN, supra note 84, at 25; see also Emerson, supra note 59, at 6 (right to
know is normally secondary to right to speak).
'" See F. SCHAUR, supra note 73, at 47. See generally supra notes 98-105, 111-115
(discussing right to know and failed marketplace concepts). Apart from its value as a tool of
democracy, freedom of speech is an end in itself, capable of fostering the self-fulfillment of
the individual. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 73, at 48; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 24 (1971) (freedom of expression fosters dignity of individual); L. TRBE, supra note 25,
at 578-79 (well-balanced view of first amendment should not make mistake of "reducing
freedom of speech to its instrumental role in the political system"). See generally supra
notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing Emerson's theory of freedom of speech as
end designed to enhance fulfillment of individual).
7 See T. EmRSON, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 64, at 4-7. The state does not exist to
be served as an end in itself, but rather exists to serve the individual. Id. at 5. Free speech is
not merely to be tolerated to achieve social goals; in fact, social goals cannot be reached if
individual needs are not first satisfied. See Mininberg, supra note 66, at 569-70; supra notes
73-79 and accompanying text.
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speech.118 Intended to promote diversity of expression, com-
promises between freedom and regulation such as those embodied
in Red Lion instead have engendered much criticism of the broad-
cast media as a "wasteland" of bland sameness." 9 Calls for the de-
regulation of broadcast media are heard from a number of critics
today. 20 Rather than mechanically applying the broadcast regula-
tory approach to the emerging cable medium, the time has come to
develop a first amendment view which reestablishes the right of
the speaker as paramount, and acknowledges the listener's right as
derivative. 2'
It is submitted that the traditional laissez-faire approach best
establishes the preeminence of the speaker's rights, and is consis-
tent with what is known about the Framers' notion of free speech.
The Framers were not interested in a fair press that reported
events in a balanced manner, 22 and it is clear that any prior re-
straint on the press violated freedom of speech as they understood
it. '2 Thus, in the traditional first amendment view, licensing re-
118 See Hagelin, supra note 81, at 439; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-90 (govern-
ment may restrain broadcast licensees to enhance rights of viewers and listeners); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943) (speech rights of radio broad-
casters may be abridged because medium not inherently available to all). See generally
supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text (discussing history and rationale for broadcast
regulation).
"I See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
155 (1973)(Douglas, J., concurring) ("nauseating mediocrity" used to describe radio and
TV); N. MINoW, EQUAL TIME 52 (1964) (television described as "wasteland").
120 See, e.g., Fowler, The Public's Interest, 56 FLA. B.J. 213, 215-16 (1982)(calling for
elimination of trusteeship approach to regulation of electronic media); B. OWEN, supra note
84, at 102-08 (broadcast regulation fails to recognize role of economic incentives); W. VAN
ALSTYNE, supra note 88, at 87 (recommending that "bid-auction" method of allocating li-
censes replace present government regulation); Lively, supra note 2, at 1083-85 (discussing
flawed rationale supporting broadcast regulation).
121 See B. OWEN, supra note 84, at 136-37. Cable television provides an opportunity to
reform broadcast regulation by increasing competition and enhancing freedom of expression
through elimination of the government's control of content. Id.
122 Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 153
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas argues for a free press even when "base and obnox-
ious," agreeing with Jefferson that even a "vulgar," "mendacious" press is the basis of lib-
erty. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring) The risk that debate will not always be comprehensive,
nor all viewpoints expressed, is the risk that a free society must take. See Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 214, 260 (1974) (White, J., concurring); see also Lively,
supra note 2, at 1096-97 (Framers accepted that speech might at times be offensive or
discomforting).
122 See L. LEvy, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 12 (1985). The common law English re-
quirement of licensing prior to publication was lifted in 1694. Id. According to Blackstone,
freedom of the press at common law meant no prior restraints on publications. See W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 814 (B. Gavit ed. 1941). It is highly doubtful that
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strictions on the press such as those imposed on broadcasters are
impermissible. 124 The rights of the people are protected by the di-
versity of interests existing in the community, not by a government
fostered diversity of speech.125
A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF CABLE TELEVISION
It is submitted that the proper starting point in the first
amendment analysis of cable television is the traditional laissez-
faire approach typical of the print media.126 It does not apply be-
cause of any supposed resemblance of print to cable, but because
the laissez-faire analysis represents what is closest to the original
view of freedom of speech.1 27
Each medium of expression must be assessed according to its
own unique characteristics. 28 Nevertheless, the first amendment
remains the standard of permissible regulation, 29 and according to
a traditional reading of the first amendment, the government's pri-
mary obligation is to protect the right of individuals to speak
the Framers intended to re-institute the licensing of the press. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note
60, at 22.
121 Cf. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1409 (licensing of cable operators based
on who government conceives to be "best" applicant is akin to licensing "best" newspaper to
serve community; both are constitutionally impermissible); Lively, supra note 2, at 1081
(regulation applied to electronic media would be unconstitutional if applied to print).
15 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324-25 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). In
Madison's view, individual rights would not be threatened by "interested combinations of
the majority" because the federal republic was "broken up into so many parts, interests and
classes of citizens." Id. at 324. Thus, the multiplicity of factions would prevent a majority
from uniting on anything but principles "of justice and the general good." Id. at 325.
126 Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 162
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("it is anathema to the First Amendment to allow Govern-
ment any role of censorship over newspapers ... TV, radio, or any other aspect of the
press").
127 See Hagelin, supra note 81, at 439-40 n.51.
'28 See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (mu-
nicipal theatre); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (motion pictures);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (sound track).
129 Cf. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43,77-78 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
(although each medium presents its own unique problems, content regulations are still pro-
hibited by first amendment).
It has been suggested that the emphasis on the "peculiar characteristics" of the broad-
cast media has brought about content regulation of these media with no objective standards
"to distinguish between permissible and impermissible regulation." Goldberg & Couzens,
"Peculiar Characteristics". An Analysis of the First Amendment Implications of Broadcast
Regulation, 31 FED. Com. L.J. 1, 41 (1978). Broadcast regulation seems to be based more on
a "rationalization of a desired outcome than a convincing principle of first amendment adju-
dication." Id.
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freely. 130 The government has no obligation to protect either the
content or the balance and diversity of the discussion.13'
Under such an approach, any attempt to regulate cable televi-
sion must undergo close scrutiny to determine its constitutionality
because of the strong presumption against any regulation of the
press.ls 2 If the regulation in question has an impact on free speech,
it must be analyzed to determine how much of an intrusion is in-
volved, and that intrusion must be balanced against any existing
state interest.'33 The analysis ranges from strict scrutiny when con-
tent regulation is involved to a balancing approach when regula-
tion of non-communicative aspects of speech are involved. 34 Each
110 Cf. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (major purpose of first amendment
is "to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs," so that suppression of press frus-
trates Framers' intent).
"I See supra note 126. The first amendment was not intended to correct "abuses" of
the press. See Bazelon, supra note 87, at 234. Therefore, government attempts to balance
discussion in the media are inappropriate because "[t]ruth and fairness have a too uncertain
quality to permit the government to define them." Id. at 236; see also Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971) (quoting Madison) (no remedies for correcting abuses
of press exist "which might correct without enslaving the press"). But cf. A. MEIKLEJoHN,
supra note 69, at 26-27 (what is important is that "everything worth saying shall be said,"
and to that end government may regulate discussion).
132 See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (first amendment "bars govern-
ment from interfering in any way with a free press"); Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (government "carries a heavy burden of showing justifica-
tion for the imposition of such a [prior] restraint"); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963) ("[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression . . . [bears] . . . a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity"); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)
(newspaper may be subjected to prior restraint only under most exceptional circumstances
relating to national security).
Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental liberties; any legislation limiting
these freedoms is to be subjected "to a more exacting judicial scrutiny." United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
133 See G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND & J. MERcumo, supra note 1, at 24. The balancing
approach, it has been argued, requires "that the thumb of the Court be on the speech side
of the scales." Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 28; see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 578 (1963) (court should "weigh the
circumstances in order to protect, not to destroy, freedom of speech").
13 See G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND & J. MERCUmO, supra note 1, at 24-25; compare Consol-
idated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) (content-based regula-
tion of speech must be "precisely drawn means of serving a compelling interest") with
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (balancing test applied to non-communi-
cative aspects of speech).
Content-neutral regulations generally receive less scrutiny than those that are content-
based. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 646, 637 (1980).
Much attention has focused on the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
regulation of speech, but this distinction has been called "theoretically questionable and
difficult to apply." Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN.
CABLE TELEVISION
form of cable television regulation can be submitted to this first
amendment scrutiny.
Cable television franchising has a definite impact on the
speech rights of cable operators because their speech is conditioned
on obtaining a license from local authorities. 135 This licensing pro-
cess is in effect a prior restraint on speech, s13 which if imposed on
a newspaper would clearly be unconstitutional.' 37 Franchising ordi-
nances may also be analyzed as a form of content regulation, be-
cause such ordinances typically vest broad discretion in an admin-
istrative body to determine which applicants will get franchises.
This has the potential to chill controversial speech of the
applicants.1 3 1
Franchising regulations that regulate content must be nar-
rowly drawn and serve a compelling state interest.39 Although lo-
cal authorities may have a compelling interest in protecting the
public rights of way, franchising ordinances generally are not
drawn with the requisite degree of specificity to pass this level of
constitutional scrutiny. 14 0 It is submitted that to pass constitu-
L. REV. 113, 113 (1981). Redish suggests that early Supreme Court opinions did not make
such a distinction, and in fact invalidated many content-neutral regulations. Id. at 121. He
contends that inasmuch as content-neutral laws can inhibit free discussion as much as con-
tent-based restrictions, content-neutral regulations should receive the same degree of scru-
tiny. Id. at 129-30.
131 See Tele-Communications of Key West v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1339 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Miller & Beals, supra note 46, at 108; cf. Lee, supra note 49, at 896-97
(cable operators have no absolute right to use public roads and facilities but may only be
restricted in such use by content-neutral regulations designed to protect public safety, con-
venience, and condition of public streets).
X36 Cf. supra note 123 (discussing common law view of prior restraint).
1" See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F. 2d 666, 675 (11th Cir.
1984). See generally T. EMFsoN, FREEDOM OF ExPREssION, supra note 74, at 667-71 (regula-
tions applied to broadcast would be unconstitutional if applied to print media).
I See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1409; see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 n.1
(1984) (FCC recommends that as part of local franchising process, "[t]he franchisee's legal,
character, financial, technical, and other qualifications ... should be approved by the
franchising authority"). The Cable Communications Policy Act leaves the terms and condi-
tions of franchising to local authorities. See HR REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1984 US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4656, 4696.
Ordinances which leave wide discretion in administrative bodies to determine the
awarding of licenses must be precisely drawn to guard against arbitrary actions by officials.
See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); see also Barnett,
State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NoTRE DAME LAW. 685, 692-94
(1972) (lack of procedures for granting cable franchises compromises public interest).
'39 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
11 See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1409.
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tional muster, a franchising ordinance must allow as many
franchises as the market will bear or that can reasonably be accom-
modated physically. It is suggested that such an ordinance would
merely reasonably control how, when, and where cable could be
installed, consistent with public safety and convenience and, there-
fore, would be nothing more than a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction.
It is submitted that when must-carry and public access regula-
tions are subjected to the standards traditionally applied to regula-
tion of the press, similar issues of content regulation appear. Cable
regulations require the operator to transmit the speech of others
regardless of whether it is consistent with the operator's editorial
policy.14 1 Operators of relatively small cable systems in areas where
mandatory carriage rules saturate the system may be prevented
from programming as they choose.142 Such an interference with ed-
itorial discretion would certainly violate traditional first amend-
ment protection of the press.1 43
Inasmuch as public access and must-carry rules interfere with
editorial discretion and thus affect content, they must be justified
by some compelling government interest.14 4 The FCC has failed to
demonstrate conclusively such a compelling interest with regard to
the must-carry rules. 145 Public access requirements, although ap-
pearing to be based on a more compelling rationale,1 4 nonetheless
rest on two questionable bases: that everyone should have access to
mass media, and that such access is necessary to bring about the
141 See Wheeler, supra note 1, at 230. The cable operator acts as an editor, in a similar
fashion as a newspaper editor does, and should be accorded the same degree of discretion.
Id.
142 See Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1451-52.
' See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1975). In Buckley, the Court stated that
"the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id.;
see also Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1453 (court may not favor some speakers over
others).
144 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
145 See Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1463. The FCC appears to doubt the compelling
need for some of its cable regulations. See 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 795 (1980); see also supra notes
12-13 (discussion of FCC's shifting approach to cable television regulation).
146 See 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). One purpose of cable regulation is to
provide for the dissemination of diverse information to the public. Id. The Quincy Cable
TV court claimed that public access rules "serve countervailing First Amendment values by




expression of a diversity of views in a failed marketplace. 14 7 Insofar
as they also emphasize the rights of viewers over the rights of
speakers, public access rules distort the purpose of the first amend-
ment.148 It is submitted that must-carry and public access rules
also fall short of the requirement that content-based regulation of
speech be narrowly tailored to achieve its end. Must-carry rules
restrict the cable operators to protect local broadcasting whether
or not such protection is needed. 49 Public access requirements are
similarly problematic, granting public access whether or not there
is a demonstrated need for it. 150
CONCLUSION
The first amendment has effectively served as a barrier to the
suppression of speech and the press by the government for almost
two hundred years. Constitutional guarantees of free expression
have been extended to new media forms, such as cable television,
as these media have developed. However, the first amendment
treatment of the cable medium to date has proceeded from the as-
sumption that because cable television has a history of regulation,
it should continue to be regulated. This approach has hindered the
development of a cohesive first amendment analysis of cable televi-
sion. It is submitted that the time has come for the Supreme Court
to develop a coherent constitutional approach to the speech rights
of cable operators. This Note has suggested that the development
of such an analysis must begin with the traditional laissez-faire ap-
proach to the press, which would give precedence to the cable op-
erator's right to speak and would not assign to government the
task of regulating the balance and diversity of the press. It is sub-
mitted that such an approach is best suited to enhancing the qual-
ity and diversity of public discussion by allowing cable technology
to develop free of stifling government regulation.
Christine Gasser
147 See Lange, supra note 59, at 77, 90-91; see also supra notes 108-109 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the marketplace metaphor).
,18 See supra note 147; see also Emerson, supra note 59, at 4 (freedom of expression
rests more on right to speak than on desire to listen).
14 Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1463; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
1850 Cf. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1054 (8th Cir. 1978) (rights of cable
operators to speak rest on first amendment, right of the public to "get on television" rises
from the FCC's desire to create that "right"), afl'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
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